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NOTES
LAST CLEAR CHANCE AND THE HUMANITARIAN
DOCTRINE IN KENTUCKY.
It is a well settled principle of law that one who is injured
by the negligent conduct of another cannot complain where
his own negligence has contributed to his injury.1 This prin-
ciple of law will permit the defendant to escape on account of
the contributing unreasonable conduct of the plaintiff.2  But
this plea of contributory negligence, even though widely
accepted, has not been so easy for the defendant. Since the
day of Davies v. Mann,3 the doctrine of last clear chance has
haunted the confines of contributory negligence, and ever since
the courts have wrestled vainly to effect a compromise between
tlhe two. The former is relied upon by the plaintiff, while the
latter plea of contributory negligence is utilized by the defend-
ant. If the plaintiff had the last chance to get out of the way
and failed, it would merely be a continuation of his contributory
negligence; hence there would be no point in the defendant try-
ing to bring in the last clear chance.
The following are suggested ways out of the clash between
contributory negligence and the doctrine of last clear chance:
(1) An interpretation of Davies v. Mann4 by saying that
the plaintiff's negligence in leaving the donkey in the road was
not the cause but the occasion for the injury. It follows that
this is not a case to apply the principle of contributory negli-
gence. The only question is whether the defendant could have
prevented the injury by ordinary care. If he could, his negli-
gence is the sole cause of the injury.5
(2) Contributory negligence applies only in cases of
simultaneous negligence, while the doctrine of last clear chance
applies only to cases of successive negligence.6
(3) The last clear chance doctrine is applicable only where
'The contributory negligence of the plaintiff must be a substantial
cause to defeat him. Burdick, Law of Torts, Fourth Ed. p. 522.
2 6 Univ. of N. C. L. R. 3.
3 10 M. & W. 546 (1842).
4 Supra note 3.5Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester & Nashua Ry. Co., 62 N. H.
159. 6Nieboer v. Detroit Electric R y., 128 Mich. 486, 87 N. W. 626.
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negligence of the defendant is proximate and negligence of the
plaintiff is remote. In other words, proximate cause is the test
of applicability of last clear chance. This really lines up with
No. 1, supra.T
(4) The doctrine of last clear chance simply furnishes a
test of proximate cause. This is just the reverse of No. 3 supra s
(5) The last opportunity which the defendant ought to
have had is equivalent in law to the one which he actually had.
This is an extreme case in that the plaintiff wins though guilty
of contributory negligence, and in fact has the last clear
chance.
Without going into the difficulties with which the terms
"simultaneous" and "successive" are fraught, it is believed
that the best one of the five suggestions is to be found in the
case of Nieboer v. Detroit Electric Ry. 10  A collection of cases
in A. L. R.11 seem to bear out the statement that in order to
have a situation to which the doctrine of last clear chance will
apply, the defendant's negligence must have intervened or con-
tinued after the negligence on the part of the plaintiff or
deceased has terminated.1 2 It should be noted that the case of
Davies v. Mann,"3 where the doctrine of last clear chance orig-
inated, was one of successive negligence. With this much in
mind, the question arises: To what situations will the doctrine
of last clear chance apply? The following situations are sub-
mitted :14
7 Drown v. Northern Ohio Traction Go., 76 Ohio St. 234, 81 N. E.
326.
zauller v. Illinois Central R. Co., 100 Miss. 705, 56 So. 783.
"British Columbia Electric Ry. Co. v. Loach, (1916) 1 A. C. 719.
The deceased was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to look
out for the car before entering upon the track. The defendant com-
pany was guilty of negligence in running at an excessive rate of speed
with defective brakes. The driver of the car saw the plaintiff in ample
time to stop had his brakes been good.. The Privy Council held the
company liable, notwithstanding the contributory negligence of the
deceased. This is the leading case in England qualifying the doctrine
of last clear chance.
"* Supra note 6.
7 A. L. R. (N. S.) 132 and 55 A. L. R. 418.
"See the situation where the plaintiff is allowed to recover under
the hurnalita-ian doctrine, infra. A case like Butterfield v. Forrester,
10 East 60, does not fall within the last clear chance, for there the
defendant's negligence had ceased when the plaintiff negligently drove
his horse into the obstruction in the highway.
" Supra note 3.1429 Y. L. J. 896
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(1) The plaintiff has placed himself (or his property)"'
in a position of helpless peril from which in all likelihood he
cannot even at the last moment extricate himself. The defend-
ant has notice of such peril in time, by the exercise of ordinary
care, to avoid injury to the plaintiff.16
(2) The plaintiff could by the use of care remove himself
from the position of peril in which he has negligently placed
himself, but he negligently remains unconscious of his peril.
The defendant has notice of the plaintiff's peril and of plain-
tiff's unconsciousness thereof in time, by use of care on his
(defendant's) part, to avoid injury to the plaintiff.' 7
(3) The plaintiff as in the first situation, has negligently
placed himself in a position of helpless peril from which he
probably cannot at the last moment extricate himself. The
defendant is not aware of plaintiff's peril, yet by using due care
(under a duty, of course) he could have discovered it in time to
enable him, by the use of care, to avoid injury to the plaintiff.
(4) The plaintiff, as in the second situation, has by his
negligence placed himself in a position of peril, from which
however, he could by the use of care at the last moment extri-
cate himself. The defendant, had he used care, could have dis-
covered plaintiff's peril and could have avoided the injury to
him.
(5) The plaintiff negligently places himself in a position
from which he could, by the use of care, remove himself. The
defendant, by some prior act of negligence, cannot, by the use
of utmost care at the time, avoid injury to the plaintiff.' s
Recovery by the plaintiff is generally allowed in the first
three situations.' 9 Recovery in the fourth situation is allowed
in a few jurisdictions, notably Missouri, under the humanitarian
"See note to 29 Y. L. J. 896, to the effect that the doctrine applies
alike to property and personal injuries.
If the plaintiff is a trespasser, his recovery will depend on the
local law as to duty to trespassers. If there is no duty owing to un-
seen trespassers, neither contributory negligence nor last clear chance
is applicable
"' Of course, in a case of this kind, if defendant's acts are so wanton
and reckless as to be wilful, it is not a case of negligence at all, and
neither contributory negligence nor last clear chance apply. Rowen
v. N. Y., N. H. & H. B. 0o., 59 Conn. 364, 21 Atl. 1073.
"A situation as found in the British Columbia Ry. Co. v. Loach,
supra note 9.
12See cases in 29 Y. L. J. 896 supra note 14.
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doctrine.20 In the case of British Cotmbia By. Co. v. Loach21
a recent case in the British Privy Council, the plaintiff was per-
mitted to recover under situation five. Professor Bohlen states
the American position:22 "So the overwhelming weight of
authority in America is to the effect that a precedent act of
negligence, whether of commission or omission, whereby the
defendant has put it out of his power to avert the accident after
discovering that it is impending, does not make him responsible
to a plaintiff who has, through his negligence, exposed himself
to the peril, and, this is so though the plaintiff's negligence con-
sists not merely of an inadvertence or absent-mindedness which
precludes him from exercising his power of self-protection, but
is some more or less deliberate act which placed him in a help-
less position in the path of the danger." Professor Bohlen goes
on to say that those jurisdictions which have accepted the
humanitarian view might properly take this final step. They
have already repudiated the theory of allowing recovery only
where the defendant's negligence is subsequent to the plain-
tiff's.
Where does the last clear chance leave off and where does
the humanitarian doctrine begin? The Missouri case of Bech-
enwald v. Metropolitan St. By. Co.23 gives the following state-
ment of the latter doctrine: "Where the injury produced by
the concurrent negligence of both plaintiff and defendant, if
the defendant before the injury discovered or by the exercise
of ordinary care could or might have discovered the perilous
situation in which the plaintiff was placed by the concurring
negligence of both parties and neglected to use the means at
his command to prevent the injury, then his plea of contrib-
utory negligence shall not avail him." The critical point of
difference between the two doctrines is that the phrase "could
or might have discovered" imposes a duty on the defendant to
discover the plaintiff's situation even though his (plaintiff's)
regligeice continues up to the time of the injury. It is clear
that if the plaintiff's negligence has ceased before the defend-
ant's the case falls within situation (3) supra, and is nothing
21 See Clark, Tort Liability for Negligence in Missouri, Mo. Law
Bul. Law Series 12, p. 3.
Supra note 9.
66 U. of Pa. L. R. 73, 76, a note commenting on the Loach case.
2121 Mo. App. 595 (1906).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
more than a case where the defendant has the last clear chance,
being under a duty to discover the plaintiff's position of help-
less peril.24 In other words, under the humanitarian view, the
plaintiff and defendant are equally guilty of inadvertence con-
tinuing until the opportunity to control the event is over. In
fact, the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable, for
neither of the parties has the last chance. This humanitarian
doctrine is variously referred to as a qualification, or refinement
or extension of the doctrine of last clear chance. At any rate,
the application of the two rules gives widely different results.
Which of the two doctrines does the Kentucky Court apply?
In Ross v. Louisville Taxicab and Transfer Co.,25 the plaintiff
was attempting to cross a street thirty-eight feet wide. He saw
the taxicab coming three hundred feet away, but went ahead and
was struck by the cab when about two-thirds of the way across.
Nothing prevented the chauffeur from seeing him, as he was in
plain view from the time he started across. The court said:
"The rule is that though the plaintiff may have been negligent
in crossing the street, still he may recover if after his peril is
discovered or by ordinary care should be discovered, the driver
of the vehicle by ordinary care may avoid the injury to him."
The court said this rule was adopted in 1856, and had been con-
sistently followed since. But what is ttis rule ? It is necessary
to look closely to the facts of each case. Under these facts, this
is plainly the humanitarian doctrine.26 The plaintiff may re
cover here even though he was negligent right up to the time
of the accident and the defendant did not even discover him.
He should have discovered, the court says. The last clear chance
is not applicable here. Either the plaintiff loses under the rule
of contributory negligence, or else he recovers under the human-
itarian doctrine, which imposed a duty on him to discover the
plaintiff's concurrent negligence.
In the Ross case 27 the court says the last clear chance doe-
" Such a case is illustrated where a drunken trespasser is killed
while asleep on the defendant's track at a point where a lookout duty
existed. Recovery has been allowed under the doctrine of last clear
chance, upon the ground that the deceased's negligence terminated upon
his lying down on the track. Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 117
N. C. 616, 25 S. E. 264.
202 Ky. 828.
2 The case was sent back for a new trial in accordance with the
instruction here.
21 Supra note 25.
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trine referred to in L. & N. B. B2. Co. v. Trisler,2 8 is a very dif-
ferent thing from the rule laid down in the Ross case. In the
Trisler case the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant com-
pany, was walking alongside track No. 3 near the station at
Lexington. The defendant's train usually came in on either
track 1 or 2, but this time it came in on No. 3. The engineer
saw the plaintiff, but gave no signal until within seven or eight
feet, just after plaintiff stepped on the track where he was struck.
The court ruled that the evidence showed clearly that the plain-
tiff had a right to believe it perfectly safe to walk on track No.
3, when the train usually came in on either 1 or 2. In other
words, the court ruled that the plaintiff was not guilty of negli-
gence and permitted him to recover. The defendant company
tried to invoke the doctrine of last clear chance, and the court
said it had never applied in this state. Obviously, there are
two reasons why the doctrine would not apply here; first,
because (as pointed out in the first part of the paper) it has
no function to perform for the defendant, and second, the court
ruled here that the plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence.
It is simply a case where the defendant is the only one guilty
of misconduct.
The rule in Ross v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer 0.29"
was said to have originated in 1856, and to have been con-
sistently followed since. The 1856 case referred to is L. & N. R.
R. Co. v. Yaiidell.3  The plaintiff sued the defendant company
for injury to his slave caused by the negligence of the defend-
ant's employees. The court said: "In regard to the second in-
struction asked by the defendants, we would merely remark,
that if, as supposed in the instruction, the slave, Henry, volun-
tarily took a perilous position, and thereby contributed to the
injury, still, it might have been prevented by the observance of
due and proper care and caution by the conductor and engineer
-that is, by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence by
them, the defendants are not exonerated from responsibility."
This appears to be a statement of the humanitarian doctrine. It
says in effect, that even though the slave was negligent and con-
tributed to his own injury, yet the plaintiff can recover if the
- 140 Ky. 451.
= Supra note 25.56 Ky. Rep. 466.
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defendants could have prevented the injury by the exercise of
ordinary care.31
In L. & N. B. R. Co. v. Lowe, 32 the plaintiff, a car inspector
for defendant, was walking down the track facing the direction
from which a train was due. Employees of the company ran
over plaintiff from behind with an engine. It appeared that the
plaintiff kept a lookout ahead, expecting a train from that direc-
tion, but did not attend to what was going on behind him. The
evidence as to a signal was conflicting. The plaintiff recovered
and the defendant excepted to an instruction which was in sub-
stance as follows: Plaintiff could not recover if but for his negli-
gence the injury would not have happened, unless appellant's
agents in charge of the engine and tender knew, or could by ordi-
nary care have known, of the peril in which his negligence had
placed him, and thereafter failed to observe reasonable care to
avoid the injury which ensued." The Court of Appeals found
no error in this instruction.33 The plaintiff's negligence here,
under the instruction, could continue right down to the time of
the accident, or, in other words, concur with the negligence of
the defendant, yet the plaintiff could recover even though the
defendant did not in fact know of the former's peril. This is a
clear statement of the humanitarian doctrine. Last clear chance
will not apply, for neither of them has the last chance.
So far it appears that the humanitarian rule has been
applied in this state, but the cases are not clear on what is being
applied. As pointed out heretofore, the court in L. & N. B. B.
Co. v. Trisler34 said the last clear chance doctrine had never ap-
plied. In Blackman v. Streicher35 the court held that the lower
court's refusal to instruct on the last clear chance doctrine was
proper. The instruction so labeled read thus: "The court in-
structs the jury that even though they may believe defendant
was guilty of negligence that contributed to cause or bring about
his injuries if they further believe defendant saw plaintiff's
The case was sent back for a new trial in accordance with this
opinion. Since the facts do not show whether the engineer and con-
ductor knew or merely should have known of the slave's perilous con-
dition, the case might be interpreted otherwise, but the interpretation
here seems to be a fair one.
- 118 Ky. 260.
"The case was reversed on other grounds.
"Supra note 28.
205 Ky. 773.
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peril in time to have avoided striking him by the exercise of
ordinary care after defendant had discovered the plaintiff's
peril, if he did so discover it, then the jury should find for the
plaintiff notwithstanding his own negligence if any." This is
the last clear chance and differs markedly from the doctrine
applied in the preceding case, in that this is discovered peril
and not "should have discovered." The facts in this case were
similar to those in Ross v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co..3 6
The reason given for refusal to instruct on last clear chance was
the absence of evidence that defendant saw or knew of plaintiff's
presence on the street until the moment the car struck him. The
case was decided for the defendant and seems inconsistent with
the holding in the Ross case.
The recent case of Peak v. Arnett37 says that it is not dis-
puted that the doctrine of last clear chance prevails in this state.
The doctrine is correctly stated in these words: " . . . if the
driver for the defendants discovered the peril of the appellant in
time, by the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid injuring him and
failed to do so, and thereby caused the injury to the plaintiff,
then the law was for the plaintiff." But the court said the
doctrine had no application to a case like the principal one
where the plaintiff stepped suddenly in front of defendant's
moving car. The statement is perfectly true that the doctrine
has no application to such facts, but do the cases cited support
the assertion that the doctrine prevails in this state? The first
case cited is Louisville Ry. Co. v. Broaddus,38 in which the court
said the instruction upon contributory negligence should be
modified, if there was evidence to warrant such, to permit plain-
tiff to recover, although he was negligent, if the defendant saw,
or by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen the peril of
plaintiff in time to have avoided injury to him. It need hardly
be said that this is not the last clear chance. No better state-
ment of the humanitarian doctrine can be found.
In the second case cited,3 9 the court uses the term "last
clear chance," and in reversing the judgment for a new trial,
says that if, on the next trial, the evidence was substantially as
Supra note 25.
"233 Ky. 756, 26 S. W. (2d) 1035 (1930).
180 Ky. 298.
'Meyers v. Cassity, 209 Ky. 315.
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it was on the first (showing contributory negligence) the ques-
tion of last clear chance should be submitted to the jury. Since
no statement is made as to what the court regards the doctrine
to be, the case really shows nothing about the status of the ques-
tion in this state. The next case of Manwaring v. Geisler4° uses
the expression "last clear chance," but it, like the preceding
one, offers little help, for it simply says that under the aver-
ments of negligence instruction on the doctrine is not authorized.
The other case cited in support of the statement that the last
clear chance doctrine prevails in Kentucky is Paducah Traction
Co. v. TValker.41 The doctrine there laid down, though called
the last clear chance, is exactly the same as recited in Louisville
Ry. Co. v. Broaddus.42 The conclusion to be drawn from these
four cases is that they do not show an application of last clear
chance, but on the contrary, two of them show positively that
the humanitarian rule is the law.
There are numerous other cases in which the humanitarian
doctrine has been upheld.43
SUAMVARY: Courts have offered several ways to get around
the clash between contributory negligence on the one hand and
last clear chance on the other. The most plausible of these seems
to be found in Nieboer v. Detroit Electric Ry.4 4 Contributory
negligence applies to cases of simultaneous negligence, while last
clear chance is applicable only to cases of successive negligence
where defendant's negligence intervenes or continues after the
plaintiff's negligence has terminated. Hence, the plaintiff is
the only one to invoke the doctrine.
The last clear chance has been extended in a few jurisdic-
tions to permit recovery under what is called the "humanitarian
rule." A party losing under the last clear chance can recover
by application of the latter. The real point of distinction be-
tween the two is that under the humanitarian doctrine the plain-
-196 Ky. 110.
169 Ky. 721.
4 Supra note 38.
41. C. R. R. Co. v. Murphy, 123 Ky. 787; Doll v. Louisvi~le By. Co.,
138 Ky. 486; Bradas v. Henry Vogt Machine Go, 175 Ky. 803; L C. R.
B. Co. v. Flaherty, 139 Ky. 147; L. & X. R. R. Co. v. Earl, 94 Ky. 374;
L. & N. B. B. Co. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 411; C. & 0. By. Co. v. Bank, 14
Ky. 137. The only case which seems to apply last clear chance is the
1876 case of Paducah & Memphis R. R. Co. v. Hoehl, 12 Bush, 41.'
4 Supra note 6.
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tiff is actively negligent, not helpless, and could by waking up to
his condition remove himself from danger, while the defendant
is unaware of plaintiff's peril, yet if he had used care he could
have discovered plaintiff's condition in time to avoid the injury.
Under such a state of facts the plaintiff is allowed to recover.
The Kentucky court uniformly applies the humanitarian
doctrine. The origin apparently dates back to the 1856 case of
L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Yandel. 45  Some cases specifically say the
doctrine of last clear chance has never applied in this state,46
(L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Trisler), while a recent case47 says there is
no doubt but that it is the rule. Another case48 recites the doc-
trine perfectly but holds it not applicable to the facts. The
safe conclusion seems to be that the courts have uniformly
applied the humanitarian doctrine, but have frequently labeled
it the last clear chance. The usual phrase used in instructing
the jury is that the plaintiff may recover despite his negligence
(active right up to the moment of the injury),49 if the defend-
ant discovered or could have discovered the plaintiff's perilous
condition in time to avoid the injury, by the use of ordinary
care. Under such a rule, the injured party may run amuck
while a negligent defendant, not knowing of his negligence,
must pay. Obviously, too much advantage is given to the in-
jured party.
JoHN C. BAGWELL.
Supra note 30.
Supra note 28.
41 Supra note 37.
4 Supra note 35.
0 Supra note 25.
